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OHA.PTER I 
Bases of Relativism in MOral Action 
l 2 
In the pragmatism of \'lilliam James there are two primary dicta 
which serve as the bases of his attacks on the universality of the 
moral law. The first dictum combines two points of relativism: 
n 1The true•, to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in 
the way of our thinking, just as 1the right 1 is only the expedient 
in the way of our behaving."; The second dictum is: "The essence of 
good is simply to satisfy a demand ••• "4 
1 This term was first used in our times by Oharles Sanders Peirce, 
in an article in the Popular Science Monthly, for January,l878. 
2 In Chapter III of this thesis, the potential meaning for moral 
values becomes actual, as the long discussion on the pragmatic 
nature of truth an~ good is used as a cornerstone for the devel-
opment of relative morality. 
; James, William, Pragmatism, New York:Longmans,Green, l$X>7 222 
4 James, William, The i'lill to Believe and Other Essays in Popular 
Philosophy, New York: Longmans, Green ,1899 201 
The complete quotation is from the chapter entitled, "The Moral 
Philosopher and the Moral Life;" the context follows: 
11The essence of good is simply to satisfy a demand. The demand 
may be for anything under the sun. There is really no ground 
for supposing that all our demands can be accounted for by 
one univt:trsal underlying kind o:!" motive than there is gro'tD'ld 
for supposing that all physical ~nomena are oases of a single 
law. The elementary forces in :e1Jftics are probably as plural as 
those in physics are. • 
- 2 -
Let us examlne what is meant in the first dictum by the word, 
"true." It would appear that the whole doctrine of pragmatism as 
utilitarian individualism hangs upon the pragmatist account of truth. 
The first sentence of the first page of the preface to The ~reantng 
5 
of Truth, begins: 11 The pivotal pa.rt of my book named Pragmatism is 
6 
its account of the relation called 1truth 1 ••• " Once the meaning 
of pragmatic truth is really clear, the other values may be related 
to it. It would first of all pragmatic elements be the most necessarily 
important, as nothing else in pragn:atism could be explained without 
first making a study of the relative truth. This truth, for James, is 
apparently a constantly changing relation bet,feen mind and reality, 
and on that basis, it is relativistic. 
5 New York:Longmans, Green, 1909 Preface 1 
6 The context here is taken from the rest of the sentence, and 
from some further quotations from the Preface: 
"The . pivotal part of my book called Pragma:tism is its account 
of the relation called 1truth 1 , which may obtain betvreen an 
idea (opinion, belief, statement, or what-not) and its object. 
1 Truth 1 I there say, 'is a property of certain of our ideas. 
It means their agreement, as falsity means their disagreement, 
with reality ••• • 
Preface xiv: 11 The pragmatist view • • • of the truth relation 
is that it has a definite content and that everything in it is 
experiencible." 
From Pragmatism, 226: "Experience is in mutation". Here the 
context describes the quarrel between the pragmatist and his demand 
for absolute a posteriorism, and the rationalist a priorism, which, 
according the James, is an incorrect pre-disposition to see things 
in reality which are not truly there. 
- ~ -
"Previous truth;fresh facts: -and our mind finds a new truth.n7 
Truth and experience are cumulative:"So far. as reality means ex-
periencible reality, both it and the truth men gain about it are 
8 
everlastingly in the process of mutation ••• n and, "truth is made 
9 . largely out of ~revious truths." There is no end to this cumulative 
process of disco~ry.•tike the half-truths, the absolute truth 
will have to be~ as a relation incidental to the growth of a 
7 James, ~lilliam, Pragmatism, 241 
The full context is given in the sentence just preceding the 
remark cited: "·Truth grafts itself on previous truth, modifying 
it in the process, just as idiom grafts itself on idiom, and 
law on previous law ••• " 
8 Ibid. 224-~5 
9 Ibid. 224 
The quotations have been transposed from the original order for 
the purpose of bringing clarity. The context is from the chapter, 
"The Notion of Truth,"and the matter under discussion there 
holds out the premiss that all beliefs are things dra\~ entirely 
from experience. "Men's beliefs at any time:are so much ex-
perience fUnded." . 
On page 225: 
11 In the realm of truth processes, facts come independently 
and determine our beliefs provisionally. But these beliefs 
make us act, and as fast as they do eo, they bring into eight 
or into existence new facts which re~determine the beliefs 
accordingly. So the whole coil and ball of truth, as it rolls 
· up, ie the product of a double influence. Truths emerge from 
facts; they dip forward into facts again and add to them; which 
facts again create or reveal new truths (the word is indifferent) 
and so on indefinitely. n 
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mass of verification experience to which the half-true ideas 
are all along contributing their quota."10 The context from which 
this quotation was taken insists that any idea of an absolute truth 
beyond the influence of conctete reality and its changing demands 
11 
is an unreal thing in itself. 11 No further experience will ever alter" 
the absolute truth, "an ideal vanishing-point towards which we imagine 
our temporary truths will some day converge. It runs on all fours 
with the perfectly wise man and the absolutely complete experience; 
12 
and if these ideals are ever realized, they will be realized together." 
10 Pragmatism, 224 
11 Ibid. 222 
12 12!!· 22, 
Also, from The Mean~ of Truth, in the chapter entitled 
"Humanism and Truth, p. 72, the following is taken: 
"The only truth that he himself ~he rationalis~ will ever 
accept will be that to which his finite experienceslead him 
of themselves. The state of mind that shudders at the idea of 
a lot of experiences left to themselves and that augura pro-
teo~ion from the sheer name of' an absolute, as if, however 
imperative, that might stand for a sort of' ghostly security, 
is li~e the mood of those good people who, whenever they hear 
of a social tendency that is damnable ••• say, "Parliament 
or Congress, ought to make a law against it, 11 as if an imp-
otent decree would give relief." 
- 5 -
There is a further note of complaint in the chapter entitled 
"The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life", where James says: 
" They ~e rationalist;J imagine an abstract moral order in 
- a 
which the objective truth reeides."1' 
The several questions begin to take shape from the root consideration 
of the relative truth. Unity always suggested the dread Absolute, 
b 
to James1' and hie insistence upon the flux of life took him into 
a demand for a truth that changed from moment to moment, even as 
1 ife changed. 
1~ Will to Believe, 194 
l'b In the same context, the article, "The Pragmatism of William 
James," by John F. McCormick, in Modern Schoolman,Vol.XX,No.l, 
remarks on this aversion of James for any absolute as always 
meaning something dead, outside of life. In the same magazine, 
0A Summary of Bergsonism" by Stewart E. Dollard, quotes the 
attitude of Bergson, who was a sympathetic acquaintance of 
James, and often echoed hie words, as holding that "science 
analyzes life by killing it." We might also say that James 
argued that an absolute truth took the life away from relative 
truth. 
- 6 -
The first question we ask in dealing with the relative truth, 
is this one: Is there a norm for the relative truth? The answer 
seems to be in the use of the word"expediency" as it appears in the 
14 dictum and in the insistence upon experience and concreteness 
of whatever truth is attained. "All the sanctions of the law of 
truth lie in the very texture of experience. Absolute or no absolute, 
the concrete truth for us, will always be that way of thinking in 
15 
which our various experiences most profitably combine." 
14 Page 1 of Thesis. 
15 Meaning of Truth, 7~ 
Also from Jragmatimn, 2~2: (Inter-relation of Truth,Expediency) 
11 It is quite evident that our obligation to ackncndedge 
truth, so far from being unconditional, is tre~endouely con-
ditioned. Truth with a big T, and in the singular, claims 
abstractly to be recognized, of course; but the concrete truth 
in the plural need be recognized only when the recognition is 
expedient. A truth must always be preferred to a falsehood 
when both relate to the same situation; but when neither does, 
truth is of as little duty as falsehood." 
- 7 -
Expediency as an attribute of truth would demand that the truth 
be temporary and provisional. Since experience is such a quick-
sand of change, as an anchor for truth it cannot be anything but 
a reference, not a real norm alone. What is expedient must also 
be verified; there is a one-aided relation to experience made by 
plunging into activity each-time we want to be certain of an idea. 
"True ideas are those which we can assimilate, validate, corrob-
orate and verify. False ideas are those which we cannot."16 
It would seem that what is true can be verified, and what is ver-
ified is expedient. The final reference for any idea or its truth 
is its usefulness, its "cash value• in terms of experience.17 
16 Pragmatism, 201 The context considers what practical difference 
.it makes in our lives to have a true idea of something; this 
is so necessary to us that life or death depend on it. 
Again, Father l.fcCormick (Footnote 1;b) makes the remark that 
James never asks more of a thing than what it does. He would 
never have asked, "~Vhat is itT• as an essence meant something 
statio to him. 
17 The past value of an experience is invalid when we consider 
that experiences cannot be substituted for each other. 
See p.lO of Thesis and p.;o. 
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Since the OO.t1orete truth means only the way in which our various 
experiences are considered to have been profitable, the note of 
profit, of expediency in the pragmatic sense, is the essence of 
truth. The attributes of this truth are to be changing, pro-
visional, temporary and utilitarian, or expedient in the pragmatic 
definition. All these notes are properties of the primary dicta 
of pragmatism; they are being sounded constantly through the entire 
writings of the American Pragmatist, William James; they are needed 
to explain the dictum on truth as being that which is expedient 
in the way of thinktng18and the good that exists merely to satisfy 
a demand. 
In a context dealing with same attacks on the relative truth, 
James says: "It the truth relation were transcendent, others might 
b t nl9H e so oo. • • e says that the anti-pragmatist weapons are only 
tools of resistance for the pragmatist. Truth is a relation for 
James, but it is given as a changing relation between mind and 
reality, and therefore 0tel•tive"to changing experience. 
18 Page 1 of Thesis. 
19 Meaning of Truth, Preface xiv 
- 9 -
He took his position on the meaning of truth because he must 
have realized that with a transcendental truth he would lose the 
final value of his a posteriori stand on the good which satisfies, 
£or the pragmatist, the demand that is there whether or not the 
good exists prior to the demand. 
Truth must be changeable as well as cumulative: "· •• truth 
becomes a habit of certain of our ideas and beliefs in their inter-
20 
vale of rest from their verifying activities." The "truth-process 
or discovery of truth, is a constant leaningtowards direct "veri-
21 fication" and," ••• we have to live today by the truth we can get 
22 
today;" also, "We get at one truth only throU,~h the rest of truth; 
and the reality, everlastingly postulated as that which all our 
truth must keep in touch with, may never be given us save in the 
' 2~ 
form of truth other than that which we are testing." 
20 Pragp;!!!. tism, 222 
The context compares truth to a quality like health. Since 
health is what the scholastics call an °entitative" habit, 
and subject to change, as betng part of a changeable dis-
position in the body, the pragmatic picture of truth becomes 
clearer. 
21 llli• 207 The context states that truth demands to be tested. 
22 Ibid. 22~ See Footnote 12 on Page 4 of Thesis. 
2~ ll..eaning of Truth, 214 
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The acceptance of the truth of a proposition is non permanent 
so long as it rests upon a changing reality. The temporary and 
provisional nature of pragmatic truth is further explained in the 
following qu9tation, \'lhich seems to say that truth cannot rest 
an~there permanently, as it is always tied to the process of ver-
ification: 
"We live forwards, a Danish thinker2~s said, but we under-
stand backwards. The present sheds a backward l~ht on the world 1s 
previous processes. They may have been truth-processes for the 
actors in them. They are not so for one who knows the later re-
velations of the story .n25 
24 Kierkegaard, Soren, as quoted by Hoffdin.g in the Journal of 
Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. II, 85-92 
25 Pragmatism, 22)-24 
The context is taken from the chapter, "The Notion of Truth", 
and underlines the modern insistence upon the idea that life 
is basically changing, and to demand an unchanging element 
is death. "Science analyzes life by killing it."Footnote l)b 
- 11 
The past nature of an experience would seem to rob it of 
'truth, because 11 the trut.h of our mental operations must always 
be an intra-experiential affair. A conception is reckoned true 
by common sense when it is made to lead to a. sensation<. The 
sensation, which for common sanae is not so much 'true' as 1rea.l 1 , 
is held to be provisionally true by the philosopher just in so far 
26 
as it covers ••• a still more absolutely real experience." 
"For objective realities are not ~' at least not in the universe 
of discourse to which we are now confining ourselves, for there they 
27 
are taken as simply being, while ideas are true~ them." Here we 
have the question raised as to whether James overlooks the onto-
logical truth. He has clearly conceived all truth as a changing 
26 Essays in Radical Empiricism, New York:Longmans,Green,l912 202-' 
The context is from the chapter entitled "The Essence of 
Humanism," Part IV, which is a summarizing and explanatory note 
in a setting of answers to ob~ections raised by opponents. 
27 Meaning of Trut.h, 155 Ch. VI A Word More About Truth" 
~ 
------------------------------------------------· 
12 -
relation, a network of 1truths 1 as plural as the discrete reality 
in which they inhere. The lack of any anchor pr unchanging value 
or anything else of a secure nature is a basic aspect of pragmatism. 
There is no room at all :f'or anything like ontological truth; James 
sticks to a relative truth tied to experience constantly in muta-
tion, and so there is no one truth for him, but a series of 1truths 1 • 
If James had been quite accurate in his terminology, he would never 
have spoken of truth in the singular, since for him there was no 
such thing in reality. 
28 
"Realities are not ~' they ~' and beliefs are true of them.• 
It would appear here that truth has a strictly logical meaning, or is 
imbedded only in knowledge, or rather in the materials of knowledge, 
which are for James, ideas. Truth cannot be called an equivalent 
of reality, an «adequation of the mind to reality," as it is in the 
29 
scholastic scheme of things. 
28 Meaning of Truth, 196 
The context is in the chapter entitled: 11 The Pragmatist 
Account of Truth and its Misunderatanders." 
29 Aquinas, Thomas, gQ. de Veritate, Q. I, a. 1 
"Oonvenientiem vero entia ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen 
verum ••• Hoc est ergo quod addit verum super ens, scilicet 
conformitatem, sive adaequationem rei et intellectus; ad q~ 
conformitatem, ut dictum est, sequitur cognitio re1. 11 
- 1.? -
~Thereas, in scholasticism, truth is expressed as a relation 
between mind and reality, ~we must attribute the same truth to 
reality and to knowledge of reality, or there is no relation left; 
in pragmatism, where true things are only true temporarily, 
there can be no ontological truth. Truth for James is a quality, 
and while he does indeed admit that truth of knowledge means that 
mind and the thing known are related, this truth remains changeable, 
on the one level. There is no higher point to which it may be 
referred. It hangs alone, and the mind may interpret reality 
entirely as it chooses, without the norm of the ontological truth 
of being. 
~ Aquinas, Thomas, S.T. I Q.l6 a.l "Utrum ver~ta.s sit in re, 
vel tantum in int;Ue'ctu." 
Also, Q.16 a. 3 ad primum; "Dicendum quod verum est in rebus 
et in intellectu ut dictum est. Verum autem quod est in rebus 
convertitur cum ente secundum substantiam •. Sed verum quod est 
in intellectu, convertitur cum ante, ut manif'estativum :: cUJh.-· 
ma.nifestato. • 
- 14 -
James cannot have understood that because he could dis-
t~ish mentally between the reality of things and their truth, 
it does not follow immediately that there is no metaphysical truth 
at all, that it is a category impressed upon unwilling reality. 
Before we may exercise our human thought upon the universe, there 
must already exist a real truth belonging to things themselves. If 
the truth of things were not a relative propoerty of being as far 
as the human mind is concerned, then reality would posses actual, 
not potential ontological truth, and there would be no ground for 
distinguishing between the being of things and their truth. The 
concept of reality as being is one thing; it is prior to the second 
concept of reality as true. 
The pragmatist relies on psychology to supply his first principles 
yet begins l-rhere the scholastic does, in being. It is his appli-
cation of hie principles that leads him away, instead of into, the 
subject and object of philosophy. 
- 15 -
James took the rationalist definition of truth as an Absolute 
prior to the concept of being in general and impressed upon it by 
the mind; his definition made truth one of a thousand other units 
of experienced philosophy. These "truth-units" form a aeries of links 
with reality, but are never permitted to leave it or transcend it. 
If we ask whose idea of the Absolute in particular does James 
attack, the answer is probably Kant's absolute. He never tires of 
attacking Kant's categorical imperative an.d his categories in 
. '2 general as 11 arti:f'icial constructions." 
He seeks truth in 11 pure experience11 : 11 Pure experience is the name I 
give to the immediate flux of life which furndshes the material to 
our later reflection with its conceptual categories.•'3ne insists 
that nTruth does not lie in the direction of the Absolute," ••• "only 
in so far as they lead us, successfully or unsuccessfully, back into 
sensible experience again, are our abstracts and universals true or 
false at all. 11 74Finally,"Taken as it does appear, our universe is to 
a large extent chaotic. No one single type of connection runs through 
all the experiences that compose it."'5 
52 Pragnatiam, 178 
55 Essays in Radical Empiricism, 95 
54 Ibid. 100 Context is on F.H.Brad+ey 1s Absolute 
55 Ibid. 46 
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There are a few other Absolutes that suffer burning at the stake 
~6 in James 1 s writings. He seems never to have dissociated the Ab-
solute antecedent to reality and the concept of the real truth that 
follows from the real existence of things. 
* * * * * * 
We may consider the pragmatic good as a twin of the pragmatic 
truth. The truth is one momentary realizn.tion of an experienced 
fact. It is part of a series carried on to no ending and in a 
cumulative activity. There is only a logical distinction in the 
scholastic mind between the truth of a thing and its being. He 
protests that we cannot know a thing without knowing also that it 
is true.~7 It follows also that good and being may also be con-
vertible, since anything, in so far as it is, is good. ,a 
~8 
Essays in Radical Empiricism, Ch.XII - "Absolutism and Rel-
a tivism1 This coversan attack on Hegelian monism. 
Will to Believe, Ch.entitled "Is Life Worth Living?" The con-
text attacks Leibnitz. 
Pragmatism, "The One and the Ma.ny1 , pp.l42 and 146 
Context attacks Royce and Bradley. 
Stmmlll Theologiae, I Q.XVI a. ~ ad tertium , 
Dieendum quod, cum dicitur quod ens non poteet apprehend! sine 
ratione veri, hoc poteet dupliciter intellegi." 
Ibid. I Q.V a.~ Reap. 
Dieendum quod omne ens, inquantum est ens, est bonum. 
17 -
In pragmatism, good has no foothold in being. "They good or bad 
mean no absolute natures, independent of personal support. They 
are objects of feeling and desire, which have no foothold or 
anchorage in Being apart from the existence of actually living mindt. 
Wherever such minds exist, '"ith judgments of good and ill, 
and demands upon one another, there is an ethical world in all its 
essential features.n~9 
James has confused two kinds of good, in the quotation. He is 
doing it deliberately, to keep his exaggerated a posterioris~ on 
a certain safe level. Also, he is attacking the categorical good 
of the Ka.ntian man. He is determined to avoid this last at any coat. 
11 In its mere material capacity, a thing can no more be good 'or 
bad than it can be pleasant or painful ••• Goodness, badness and 
obligation must be realized somewhere in order really to exist.n4o 
He concentrates on this realization of the appetite to the exclusion 
of any other good. "We are asking whether goods and evils and obli-
gation exist in physical facts ·per ee. Surely there is no status 
for good or evil to exist in, in a purely insentient world." 4f 
~9 Will to Believe, 197 The context here gives a striking picture of 
two human beings surviving alone to exist 'n a universe that has 
shrunk to one rock. There is still an ethical universe so long as 
these two live, James says. He seems to think that transcendentals 
require space and immGnsity in which to exist. 
4o Ibid. 190 
41 Ibid. 190 The word 'insentient' seems to mean 1 inorganic 1 in 
James. See p. 2~, Footnote 5, of thesis. 
18 -
The point that James is making is lost unless we remember his 
dislike of all absolutes, and hie denial of the view of reality 
that may change and yet offer an unchanging truth. For the prag-
matist there is never a chance to rest in the termination of 
the operation. The appetite never gains its end, nor does it 
delight in a. good obtained for very long. The scholastic takes 
a. bonum sibi, the existing thing looked at as good in as much as 
it.!!; the bonum honestlliD. or the object which is good because it 
is the perfecting of the appetite; and the bonum utile which is 
good as a means, and is an instr'Uri.lent, for the attainrr:ent of an 
42 
end that is the real good. 
The pragmatist denies all subjective good, the bonum sibi, and 
the bonum honestum or objective good as well. It is the outcome 
42 Aquinas, Thomas, S.T. Q.5, a.6, Reap. 
"· •• Sic ergo in motu appetitus, id quod est appetibile 
terminans motum appetitus secundum quid, ut medium per quod 
tenditur in aliud, vacatur utile. Id autem quod appetitur ad 
ultimum, terminans totaliter medium motum appetitus, aicut qua.edam 
res_ in qu.a.m per se appetitus tendit, vacatur honestum, quia 
honeatum dicitur quod per se desideratur. Id autem quod ter-
minat motum appetitus ut quies in res desiderata, est delec-
ta.tio. n 
Ill"'" 
--------------------------------------------. 
- 19 -
of an extreme degree of a posteriorism. In the important dictum: 
4' 
"The essence of good is simply to satisfy a demand ••• " which 
has been quoted, it is evident that a pragmatic good does not exist 
prior to the demand. It answers a demand that is already there, 
blindly seeking something to satisfY it, and the demand is as 
stated, indifferent to which good satisfies it. . 
Good, in pragmatism, does not exist as good until it has actually 
been good, been realized in the satisfaction of a demand. It follows 
upon its acceptance as something good that anything satisfactory 
is made to be good actually. 
4' Will to Believe, 201 See also First Page of Thesis. 
The context is taken from the·chapter, "The Moral Philosopher 
and the Moral Life,• and is mostly a protest against all 
absolutes; 
"The various ideals have no common chc.racter apart from the 
fact that they are ideals. No single abstract principle can 
be so used as to yield to the philosopher anything like a 
scientific~lly accurate and genuinely useful casuistic scale." 
20 -
James :makes a double mistake about the character of the good. 
He denies the existence of an ontological good and he misconceives 
the relation good has to the demand of·a nature for it. There is 
no criterion for him of truth or good outside the cha.Ming aspect 
of things in reality. Both truth and good ar~ tied to his sort of 
expediency. 
11 Truth is one species of good, and not1 as is usually supposed, 
44 
a category ••• 11 The entire dictum on truth may be profitably 
tkaen up here again, as the best expression of James's way of ex-
pressing his pragmatic principles: 
• 
"The true, to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the 
way of our thuu{ing, just as 1the right' is only the expedient in 
the \;ray of our behaving. Expedient ~ almost any fashion, and ex-
pedient in the long run and on the whole course; :f'or what meets 
expediently all'the experience in sight won't necessarily meet all 
further experience equally satis:f'actorily. Experience, as we know, 
has ways of boiling over, and making us convert our present :f'ormula.s. 111!; 
44 Pragmatism, 80 
45 l.lli,, 222 The italics are those of :,'filliam James. 
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This discussion on the nature o£ the pragmatic truth is a 
necessary prelude to the further consideration of the· pragmatic 
treatment of the universal moral law. Once the pragmatist has 
established his relative truth, then all 'rightness' of action 
becomes relative as well. If there is no truth in being, as a 
part of its necessary structure, then it follows that all truths 
are left without an anchor. 
There remain to be considered the application of truth, in 
the pragmatic law, and the moral law. The meaning of the moral 
law in James derives its fundamentals from the attributes of the 
pragmatic truth as mutable, provisional, and cumulative. 
* * • • * • 
CHAFfER II 
Relativism in the Moral Life 
The problem of morality in the writings of William James 
1 is complicated by his treatment of the will , his concept of 
2 
the individual as an experiencing aggregate, and his treatment 
of first principles as entirely of psychological origin.; 
While these are treated in scholastic philosophy as part of a 
philosophy of man, it is impossible to incorporate them substantially 
in this thesis without spending much apace on James's psychology. 
They are philosophical propositions treated psychologically by 
James, and since he has kept them almost entirely _!!! his psych-
ology, unless we commence a study of conditioned reflexes along 
with the study of morality in James, we cannot treat of those items. 
A complete study of morality in James would involve much mention 
4 
of a minimum of neurological anatomy, etc. 
1 Principles of Psychology, Vol.II, Ch. 2Z, "The WillR 
2 Ibid. Chapter 10, "The Passing Thought is the only Thinker 
\ihich Psychology Requires." 
; .!J?.!!!. Chapter 4, "Habit" 
4 ~. Chapter ;, "On Some General Conditions of Brain Act.iyity." 
Vol.II Chapter 2;, "The Production of ~wvement" 
Chapter 24, "Instinct" 
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To keep in the sphere of philosophy and away from the empirical 
psychology of pragmatism, we must start our study of moral life 
with a survey of the philosophy of activity, as distinct from 
the psychological or physiological principles of production of 
movement. 
Activity must be considered as such before we can approach the 
pragmatic definition of moral activity and the meaning of the word, 
For a real beginning we take the postulate;"Nothing shall 
be admitted as a fact ••• except what can be experienced at same 
definite time by some experient; and for every feature of fact ever 
so experienced, a definite place must be found somewhere in the 
final system of reality.n4 
The prtmitive stuff of our lives is not merely a process, a 
"something going on115aome,there. It 1a, for the pragmatist, also 
a sense of change, a something going on in relation to the individual 
4 Essays in Radical Empiricism, 160 
5 Ibid. 161 
"Now it is obvious that we are tempted to affirm activity 
wherever we find anything going on. Taken in the broadest sense, 
any apprehension of something doing, is an experience of activity • 
• • • 
10hange taking place 1 is a unique content of experience, 
one of those 1conjunctive 1 objects which radical empiricism 
seeks so earnestly to rehabilitate and preserve. The sense of 
activity is thus in the broadest and vaguest way synonymous with 
the sense of 1life 1 • We should feel our ~nn subjective life at 
least, in noticing and proclaiming an otherwise inactive world." 
(Note: Inactive, insentient and inorganic would seem to be equi-
valents. See p. 17, Footnote 41.) 
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having the e%perience. Activity in the abstract is a dead thing, 
and ca~ot very well be used in considering life and its processes, 
except as one uses a skeleton to learn about a part of man. The 
pragmatic appeal is to something happening now, not in the past 
or in the future.6 
Activity without an actor is not admissable to the universe 
of pragmatism, for the actor is the first point of reference. 
"Bare activity would thus be predicable, though there were no definits 
direction, no actor, and no aim ••• But in this actual world of 
ours, as it is given, at least a part of the activity comes with 
definite direction; it comes with desire and sense of goal."7 
6 Ibid. 160 
-vsy the principle of pure experience, either the word, 
'activity' must have no meaning at all, or else the original 
type and model of whs. t it means must lie in some concrete 
kind of experience that can definitely be pointed out." 
p. 162 
"It seems to justify, or at any rate to explain, Mr. W- 1s 
expressions that we !£! only as we are active, for we !I! 
only as experients." 
p. 167 
"The word •activity' has no imaginable content whatever 
save these experiences of process." 
7 ~· 162 
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That sense of goal belongs to the single actor, the acting 
individual. He alone is responsible for hie actions and he 
alone in the universe is acting. He alone measures the universe 
to himself. for example, the story has already been cited,8 in 
which James pictures the universe shrunk to one rock on which there 
remain two hunan beings. "That rock would have as thoroushly 
moral a constitution as any possible world which the eternities 
and immensities would harbor. n9 James remai:ks that we are the in-
habitants of that rock; whether a god exists or not, we form an 
ethical universe}0we rule our 0\'m actions alone, it seems to follo,.,. 
The word, "moral, n in James, has almost as many meanings as it 
11 has usages. He has been quoted as saying that wherever human 
minds exist, there is an ethical world in its essential features. 
8 Page 16 of Thesis, Footnote ;9 
9 Will to Believe, 197 
10 ..!lli· 197 The context implies that our actions are subject only 
to our own minds; we have no direct contact with anything else 
but experience, therefore nothing else can be a reference of 
action. 
11 Page 16 of Thesis, Footnote ;9 
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In the same context, he uses the word, "moral," as being 
equivalent to "ethical"; examples occur in the book, The \'l..ill 
to Believe, in the chapter entitled "The l4oral Philosopher and the 
~~ral Life," whdch offers an examination of ethical philosophy.12 
Another use of th~ word, •moral", occurs in another context. 
Here James has assumed the role of a teacher discussing the for-
me.tion of habits. Good habits, he says, are useful action, but 
bad habits are not only not useful, but harmful to the one ovr.ning 
l~ them. In the same place, J.S. Mill is quoted as saying that a 
perfect character is a completely trained will. He~e it would seem 
"moral" has been limited to the sense of being"rooted in the will." 14 
12 See Chapter III of Thesis, pp.40,4l 
1~ Talks on Psychology and Lire's Ideals, Chapter 8,p.70 
p.64 
The context is taken from the chapter,"Laws of Habit", in the 
division called, 11Ma.xims for Habit-Forming", and is directed toward 
explaining in non-psychological language theories of habit form-
mation, or automatic tendencies to act 1n a certain way. "All our 
life, so far as it has definite form, is but a mass of habits, 
-practical, emotional, intellectual, - systematically organized 
for our weal or \'foe, and bearing us irresistibly toward our 
destiny, whatever the latter tmy be. n 
14 Quoted on p. 70 of Talks on Psychologt: 
"A 1character 1 ,as J.S. Mill says, is a completely fashioned 
will." 
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Again, in his psychology, the word, "moral", appears in 
James's writings in the connection of habit with moral principles. 
1 Moral principles are quite incongruent with the order of 
nature; 
The moral principles which our mental structures engender 
are quite as little explicable in toto by habitual experiences 
having bred inner cohesions. Rightness is not ~ usualness, 
wrongness not~ oddity, however numerous the~cts which 
might be invoked to prove such identity. Nor are the moral 
judgments those most invariably and emphatically impressed 
on us by public opinion. The most characteristic and peculiarly 
moral judgments that a man is called on to make are in tm-
precedented oases and lonely emergencies where no popular 
rhetorical maxim can prevail, and the hidden oracle alone can 
speak; and it speaks quite often in favor of conduct quite 1 unusual and suicidal as far as gaining popular approbation goes." 5 
There no development elsewhere in James that really explains the 
terms he uses or the propositions set up in the quoted paragraph 
above. A further citation from James is offered, however, 
to illustrate his use of "moral" as referring to ethics, and 
yet with its psychological meaning as applied to a movement of 
the will. 
15 Principles of Psychologr, Vol.II, 672 
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"Every now and then someone is born with a right to be ortginal, 
and his revolutionary thought or action may bring prosperous 
fruit. He may replace old 'laws of ~ture' by better ones, he 
may, by breaking old moral rules in a certain place, bring in 
a total condition of things more ideal, than would have followed 
16 had the rules been kept.n 
The immense importance of this lonely revolutionary in the 
pragmatic world is an example of its unitary notion of activity. 
If there is any wider activity than that of the single actor, "the 
question of how far it is successfully exerted can be answered 
only by investigating the details of fact."l7 
16 Will to Believe, 208 
17 Essays in Radical Empiricism, 180 
The context remarks, on p. 178, that we like to believe 
that activities of both a wider and a narrower span are at 
work together in reality, that the long-span tendencies 
yoke the others in their service; but that it is a problem 
how to represent the modus operandi of such steering of 
small tendencies by large ones. 
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The problem raised by the pragmatist cannot be answered 
entirely on his level. We must discuss the scholastic Absolute 
and consider the quarrel of James with all absolutes, commenced 
in Chapter I of this thesis. 
For the pragmatist, it is the individual alone who is considered 
I 
in our pluralistic universe of chaotic units. The nature of this 
single actor is as pluralistic as is his universe. Hie will is 
"an aggregate of tendencies to act in a fi~·and prompt and 
definite way in all the principal emergencies of life."18 In 
In his quarrel with the scholastic definition of the powers of 
the soul, James says: 
"There is something grotesque and unnatural in the supposition 
that the soul is equipped with elementary powers· of such an 
ingeniously intricate sort ••• Evidently the faculty does not 
exist absolutely, but operates under conditions."l9 
19 
Talks on Psychology and Life's Ideals, 
Context is on the formation of good and 
(Page 26 of Thesis.) 
Principles of Psychology, Vol.I, p.~ 
70 
bad habits. 
,0 -
In the quotation just given, James was thinking of the memory, 
and denying to it any absolute character. Perhaps this is because 
one experience may not be substituted for another, in a system of 
20 
experiences: 
"The only function that one experience can perform is to 
lead to another experience; and the only fulfilment we can 
apeak of is the reaching of a certain experienced end. \'lhen 
one experience leads to (or can lead to) the same end as 
another, the agree in function. But the whole system of ex-
periences as they are immediately given presents itself as a 
quasi-chaos through which one can pass out of an initial term 
in mny directions and yet end in the same terminus, moving from 
next to next by a great many possible paths.n21 
So we have the pragmatic man, with a will strictly pluralistic, 
in movement toward a reality that offers a chain of experiences. 
"To begin with, how ~ things so insecure as the successfUl 
appearances of this world afford a stable anchorage? A chain is 
no stronger than its weakest link, and life is after all a chain. 022 
20 See page 19 of Thesis; this is an echo of the dictum on the 
good as anything that satisfies a demand; finality in activity 
seems to be left out. 
21 Essays in Radical Empiricism, 6; 
The context is from the chapter,"A World of Pure Experience." 
22 Varieties of Religious Experience, 1;6 
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The rule of action in the world of experience is imbedded in 
empirical facts. 1 Life is one long struggle between conclusions 
based on abstract ways of conceiving cases, and opposite conclusions 
prompted by our instinctive perception of them as individual facts." 2' 
This and other pragmatic problems2tead us into the study of prag-
ma.tic law. 
James says that scientific laws are gained by disregarding the 
chaos of conditions present in the universe: "The principle of uni-
trormity of nature is of this sort; it has to be sought under and in 
spite of the most rebellious appearances; and our conviction of its 
truth is far more like a religious faith than like assent to its 
demonstrations."25 
23 Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, 674 
The context is .from the chapter, "Aesthetic and Moral 
Principles", in which the man of instinct is praised as being 
more true to his nature tba.n the man who can spin out e. 
lengthy commentary on ideals ways of' acting. 
24 Page 3 of' Thesis, .footnote 7 and Page I of' Thesis. 
The dictum on the pragmatic truth raises the problem of the law. 
25 Principles of' Psychology, Vol. II, 636-37 
It ie increasingly evident in this Chapter II that the only 
answer to the pragmatic rule of action is the admiesion of an 
26 Eternal Lawgiver, whose attributes help to bring order into the 
world of Being. If we have only the chaotic unverse with no single 
pattern running through it, then we have no reason at all. But James 
says that there is an intellect in the universe that must be con-
sidered - man 1s. "Visible nature is all plasticity and indifference, 
27 
- a moral multiverse, as one might call it.·:and not a_ moral universe.• 
In another book. James says: "The pursuit of ends and choice are 
the marks of Mind 1s presence.•28 The pragmatist recognizes only one 
intellect in the universe, and that is man's. This single activity 
29 is not visibly dependent upon activities of a "wider span." 
Whatever destiny the pragmatic man may have, it does not influence 
his momentary deqision or his immediate actians.}O 
26 See Conclusions of Thesis for Eternal Law. 
27 Will to Believe, 4~,44 
28 Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, in Chapter,"The Scope of 
Psychology. 11 
29 Page 28 of Thesis, Footnote 17 
;o Page 15 of Thesis, Footnote ~5 
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James attacks the rationalist absolute, that o£ one Heinrich 
~1 
Rickert; in a chapter concerned with truth primarily, but also 
protesting against absolutes as regulating laws. 
"They ~beolute principle!} are his ~e rationalist'~ evidence 
merely, they are no part of the life of truth ittel£. That life 
transacts itself in a purely local or epistemological, as dis-
tino~ished £rom a psychological, dimension, and its claims antedate 
and exceed all personal motivations whatsoever.•~2 
The point is quite true i£ applied to such an absolute as the 
transcendental idealists give us·. A friend of James, Josiah Royce, 
may also have been partly responsible £or the dictum on the life 
o£ truth.~~ 
~1 Mentioned in Pragmatism, 2~2, Footnote. In an article by Kurt 
·Leidecker in D. Runes' Dictionary o£ Philosophy, Rickert is 
called a f'ollo'"er o£ Fichte and a transcendental idealist. 
~2 P.ragmati~, 228 From the chapter,"The Notion o£ Truth." 
~~ Article on Josiah Royce, calling htm a neo-Hegelian, in Runes 
Dictionary of Philosophy. This article is most unf'air, as the 
deeply religious Royce was really a sort o£ pantheist. At least, 
he bears t.he marks o£ Spinoza 1 s search f'or God, rather than the 
Hegelian absolute. 
~4 -
A formula for law in William James is rather hard to find 
from his ~xtant writings. First of all, law seems to have as 
II 1.1 ,l changing an aspect as the relative truth: ••• their Laws_:] 
great use is to summarize old facts and lead to new ones. They 
are only a man-made language, a conceptual shorthand, as someone 
calls them, in which we write our reports of nature; and lang-
uages, as is well known, tolerate much choice of expression and 
many dialects. 11;4 
\1.hile law in the moral world is not meant here, but the laws of 
nature, James sees all law in the aame distasteful com~ as the 
absolutes: 
"Common-law judges sometimes talk about the law, and schoolmasters 
talk about the latin tongue, in a "rtay to make their hearers think 
they mean entities pre-existent to the decisions or to the words 
and syntax, determining them unequivocally and requiring them to 
~t; 
obey • •• u~, ..... 
;4 Pragmatism, 57 
~5 Ibid. 240-41 The context is from the chapter,"Pragmtism 
and Humanism. n 
;5 -
As far as conduct is concerned, James sweeps away any possible 
moral law: "Distinctions between the lawful and the unlawful in 
conduct, or between the correct and incorrect in speech, have grown 
up incidentally among the interactions of men's experience in detail; 
and in no other way do distinctions between the true and the false 
in belief ever grow up ••• •;6 
James also charges that we set up an Almighty and read our thoughts 
into His mind; we see Him thinking in conic sections and syllogisms, 
and our laws are ours, not His. These complaints are quite fair. 
God does not go about His business with the same sort of tools He 
has given his creature, man: ;7 
"When the first laws were discovered, men were so carried away 
by the cleanness, beauty and simplification that resulted, that 
they believed themselves to have deciphered the eternal thoughts 
of the Almighty. He made Kepler's laws for the planets to follow, 
and when we rediscover any one of these, his wondrous institutions, 
we seize his mind in its very literal intention. 
But as the sciences have developed farther, the notion has 
gained ground that :3~t, perhaps all, of our laws are only 
approximations ••• " 
;6 Pragmatism, 241 
;7 Pragmatism, 56 Ohapter, "\'lhat Pragmatism Means• 
;8 1l?,g. 56,57 
- 36 
Law in general, is, ~or James, a sort of application of 
his pragmatic truth. Indeed, it would appear that the relative 
truth of Chapter I of this thesis w~uld rob law of any stable 
meaning whatsoever. I~ there is no real truth to rule on, 
no truth that does not change and can be applied in a law, then 
no law stands, whether it be natural or moral. 
The application of the relative truth means also a relative 
law. There is only one "truthme.ker" in the tmiverse, and that 
is man himself. It ~ollows that his law will be also a reflection 
of his temporary truth, and another expression of utilitarian 
individualism. 
• • * • 
CHAPrER III 
~~ral Activity and the Actor 
The landscape of pragmatic citations provides, in the 
previous chapters, the background of the specific point in 
question, the place of the moral law in pragmatism. There are no 
first principles taken absolutely,in the moral order, in James: 
"Since everything which is demanded is by that fact a good, must 
not the guiding principle for ethical philosophers (since all 
demands cannot conjointly be satisfied in this poor world) be simply 
1 to satisfy at all times as many demands as we can!" 
"So far as the casuistic question goes, ethical science is just 
like physical science, and instead of being deducible all at once 
from abstract principles, must simply bide its time and be ready 
2 
to revise its conclusions day by day." With a good that is relative 
to a changing demand?and a relative truth which cannot be applied 
by any single law, we have no finality in ethics. 
1 Will to Believe, 205 "The ¥~ral Philosopher and the Moral Universe" 
2 .!1?.!!. 208 
? Page 19 of Thesis. 
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The finishing touch is given b~ James in a context in which he 
says that since metaphysics and theology, which provide the primary 
postulates for ethics, are also in a state of flux: " The chief 
of all reasons which concrete ethics cannot be final is that 
they [si~J wait upon metaphysical and theological beliefs .n4 
I£ there is no finality in ethics, then there are no universal 
laws for human action. In Chapter I of this thesis, truth liaS 
shown to be quite unitary, measured by the individual to his own 
need and desire. He alone is the one who establishes his end, or 
ends. There can be no universal destination for all humans in the 
pragmatic universe, and no universal moral law regulating them 
toward that end.5 
4 Will to Believe, 210 
The context is someidJa.t like the one from Descartes 'Method: 
"0£ Philosopb1 I will say nothing, save that when I saw that 
it had been cultivated for many ages by the most distinguished 
men, and that yet there is not a single matter within its sphere 
which is not still in dispute, and nothing, therefore, which is 
above doubt, I did not presume to anticipate that my success 
would be greater in it that that of others ••• As to the other 
Sciences, inasmuch as these borrow their principles from 
Philosophy, I judged that no solid superstructure could be 
raised on foundations so infirm." 
(Tr.Veitch, Chicago:Open Court,l899 page 8) 
5 See Page 26 of Thesis, footnote 1~ 
~9 -
There mus~ be some sort of rule by which ~he pragmatis~ may 
make his decisions. Even with a relative good, there mus~ be a 
judgment of some kind. James has taken his moral rule from the 
rela~ive good. He refuses ~ see good or evil in physical facts 
as such, and says tha~ there is no room for goods and evils ~o 
6 exis~ in, in an insen~ien~ world. "How can one physical fact be 
considered simply as a physical fact, be 1 bet~r 1 than another? 
Betterness is not a physical relation."7 
If we consider the pragmatic picture of moral activity by 
a free agent, man, who is his own moral universe, and forget 
about the several meanings of good8, then James is quite right. 
6 Will to Believe, 190 Page 17 of Thesis 
7 Ibid. 190 
8 Page 18 of Thesis, Footnote 42 
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The furthering of the pragmatic rule is attempted in this 
quotation :from "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life 11 : 
"Imagine an absolutely material world, contatn~ only 
physical and chemical facts, and existing from eternity without 
a God, without even an interested spectator. ':lould there be any 
sense in saying of that world that one of its states is better 
than another? Or if there were two such worlds possible, \vould 
there· be any rhyme or reason in calling one good and the other 
bad? Good or bad positively, I mean, and apart from the :fact 
that one might relate itself better than the other to the phil-
osopher's private interests."9 
Just what is gained by taking such e. stand is really a 
mystery that remains in the mind of William James. If' we are 
to apply hie pragmatic rule to his remarks, then we can answer 
that since no such world or. worlds exist, or can exist, then 
there is no possible application of them in a philosophy of 
pure experience. 
9 Will to Believe, 187 
Also, Aquinas, Thomas, from the De Veritate, Q.I,a.l 
11 Si omnia intellectus (quod est impossibile) intelligeretur 
auferri, nullo modo ratio veritatis remaneret. 0 
r 
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After his confusion regarding the various kinds of goods, 
James takes the attitude t:Qat to assume an abstract good or 
bad is to assume an abstract zero: 
nGoodneas, badness and obligation must be realized somewhere 
in order to exist, and the first step in ethical philosophy 
is to see that no merely inorganic 'nature of things' can realize 
them. Neither moral relations nor the moral law can Sl'ling in vacuo. 
Their only habitat can be a mind which feels them; and no world 
composed of purely physics.! facts can possibly be a world to 
which ethical propositions apply." 10 
There must be some individual to make a demand before anything 
is good, and in the universe only those individuals can seek 
a goal, according to James. Certainly he is right to say that 
the moral law cannot swing in vacuo. It doesn't, except in 
his system. The nature of good and evil should provide a setting 
for moral activity, and when good is purely relative, then we have 
relative morality. 
10 Will to B~lieve, 190 
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The word, "sentient" , seems to be equivalent to "living" ; 
as James says that mind is shown to be present by the presence 
of ends and choice, so even in a pragmatic world, only a living 
thing with mentality could desire anything. The position of 
the single moral being becomes clearer: 
"The moment one sentient being, however, is made part of the 
universe, there is a claim for goods and evils to exist, really. 
Moral relations now have their status, in that being's con-
sciousness. So far as he feels anything to be good, he makes 
it good. It 1! good, for htm,is absolutely good, for he is the 
sole creator of values in that universe, and outside of his 
opinion things have no moral character at all. In such a universe 
as that it would be absurd to raise the question of whether the 
solitary thinker's judgment is good or ill, or true or not. Truth 
supposes a standard outside the thinker to which he must conform; 
but herit the thinker is a sort of divinity, subject to no higher 
judge. 11 
The difference to reality of the introduction of a •sentient" 
being is not very clear. Nature is not regarded as the work of 
intelligence, in the pragmatic system. Man apparently is not 
to be accounted for by introducing a Creator. \fuat sort of relation 
man has to nature is hard to see, and his relation to his fellow 
man is something quite incomprehensible. 
11 Will to Believe, 190 
- 4;-
Jamea considers his single actor in the universe as the 
one kind of intelligence needed in the picture: 
"Let us call the supposed universe which he inhabits a 
moral solitude. In such a moral solitude it is clear that 
there can be no outside obligation, and that the only trouble 
the god-like thinker is liable to have will be over the con-
sidering of his own several ideals with one another. Some of 
these will no doubt be more pungent and appealing than the· 
rest, their goodness will have a profounder, more penetrating 
taste; they will return to haunt htm with more obstinate re-
grets if violated. So the thinker will have to order his life 
to them as its chief determinants, or else remain im1ardly 
discontented and unhappy. Into. whatever equilibrium he may settle, 
though, however he may straighten out his system, it will be a 
right system. For beyond the facts of his own subjectivity 
there is nothing moral in the world." 12 
The context continues with the introduction of another solitary 
thinker into the universe which had but one. There are two 
possibilities, James says, in the ethical situation. i'/e have 
twice as much of the ethical quality as before, but no ethical 
unity. Each of the two thinkers may ~ore the other and proceed 
at his own pace. We have a moral dualism, and a thing may be 
good for one and bad for the other, with equal truth in the 
two judgments.1; 
12 Will to Believe, 191 
1) ~- 191,2 
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If we continue to add solitary thinkers to our universe: 
"Multiply the thinkers into a pluralism, and we find realized 
for us in the ethical sphere something like the world which the 
antique skeptics conceived of - in which the individual minds 
are the measures of all things, and in 'rthich no one 1 objecti!~ 
truth' but a multitude of subjective opinions can be found." 
Existing reality and the social order force James to admit that 
no one really does live entirely to himself'. There is something 
called "obligation" which arises in all systems, even that of 
the pragmatist, in spite of the unitary measure of all things 
taken as man. We are jostled by conflicting realities, and diff-
erent claims are made on us. James answers: "Invent some manner of 
own 
realizing your/ideala which will also satisfY the alien demands -
that and that only is the path of peace!" l5 Also, 0 those ideals 
must be written highest which prevail at the least cost.nl6 
14 Will to Believe, 192 
15 .!!2.!i· 205 
16 .!.!2i4. 205 
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Obligation ~or the pragmatist does not reside in any absolute 
right or a prior claim: 
"Since the outcome o~ the discussion so far has been to 
show that nothing can be good or right except so far as 
sooe consciousness ~eels it to be right, we perceive on the 
very threshold that the real superiority and authority which 
is postulated by the philosopher to reside in some of the 
opinions which he supposes must belong to others, cannot be 
explained·-i>y •DF-abstraet moral 1nature of things 1 existing 
antecedently to the thinkers themselves and their ideals. Like 
the positive attributes, good and bad, the comparative ones, 
better and worse, must be realized in order to be real.u17 
The final word is well summed up in this sentence: "If one 
ideal judgment be objectively better than another, that betterness 
must be made flesh by being lodged concretely in someone 1 s actual 
18 ~ perception. 11 If we grant there is no other intellect in the 
universe than the human mind, and that there is no superior 
power in human lives, then we do indeed have a pragJpa.tic universe. 
17 Will to Believe, 192-5 
18 Ibid. 195 
i· 
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In our universe of moral solitudes, we have the picture 
of a pattern of equal demands. There is no ruler in that world. 
"If one of the thinkers were obviously divine, wpile all 
the rest were human, there would probably be no practical 
dispute about the matter. The divine thought would be 
the order, to which the others should conform. But still 
the theoretical questf~ remains, What is the good of ob-
ligation, even heret" 
If we recall the obviously divine gods of the Greeks,20to 
whom homage was paid through f'ear, we may understand the question. 
The pragmatist does not consider a Creator, and it follows that 
man's obligation to man cannot exist unless first the obligation 
to hie God is understood. 
Since the cora of pragmatic ethics is the pragmatic truth and 
the relative good, and each individual has his own law, any over 
all unity in the moral order is impossible. There is no moral 
19 Will to Believe, 19' 
20 Aeneidoa,L.I ~. Vergilius ¥aronis, Excursus I - De ministerio 
deorum, imprimis Iunanis, in Aeneide Heyne, ed. 
London: Black and Young,l8'2 
r 
order, but a moral disorder. The universality of law stems 
21 from its very nature, not alone from the lawgiver. If' each 
has his own law, we have a :multitude of values, and no clear 
pattern of relationships. We have an aggregate. but not a 
corpus. The contrast with the integrated humanism of another 
point of view is very evident. If we are to live together in 
human accord, then each must bring hie share to the organism we 
call society; no man can consider himself able to live alone, 
in the moral sense. He is never ~·~part from them in the matter 
of morals. The chaos of values that results from a multiplicity 
of moral laws means disaster for man and his society. 
21 Aquinas, Thomas, S.T. Ia-IIaeQ.lOO a.4 Reap. "--Et sic 
ex quatuor praedictiS poteet colligi definitio legis, 
quae nihil est aliud quam quaedam rati9nis ordinatio ad 
bonum commune, ab eo qui curam conmrunita.tis habet, promulgata. n 
The pragmatic attitude toward law is well presented in a book 
called Mr. Justice Holmes, edited by Feliz Frankfurter. Holmes 
remarks that handling actual issues instead of resting on formula 
meant the difference between lif'e and death. Benjamin Oardozo 
quotes the exact phrase on p.2.). John Dewey writes on "Justice 
Holmes- and the Liveral Mind, 11 and quotes him as saying ~t the 
Constitution is an expertment,as all life is an experi=ant. In 
Frankfurter's article, the Supreme Oourt Justice says that law is 
less important than he who interprets it. 
r 
-~-
The pragmatic man is never sure of his footing 
in his slippery universe. He is forever a stranger in his 
daily life. He bas nothing to hold himself erect by, and so 
must proceed to grasp at expediencies, the lmtest of the 
crutches men may use to provide a framework for their moral 
judgments. Man is robbed of his full humanity in a pragmatic 
world, for if he really believee that all law is merely a 
changing set of arbitrary rules, then anyone who is strong 
enough can impose any law and be obeyed. There will never be 
an appeal to a higher justice than that of might making right. 
• * * • • • 
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CONCLUSIONS: 
We have given the scholastic definition of law on page 47. 
The background for all law lies in the realization of an 
Absolute Being who is the Exemplar1of creation, in \'those 
Ydnd all things are2 , and who, because He is Truth and Good 
and does not participate in those attriButes as mere derived 
qualities, must be the first measure of these values in this 
world of created things.; 
In his quarrel with the consideration of such a being, James 
remarks in a famous passage,4that God's metaphysical attributes 
have no intelligible (practical) significance, and his lists 
these attributes, ending with the complaint that we have a 
' 
11metaphysicM. monster" who doesn 1t make much difference in the 
universe, practically speaking. 
1 Aquinas, Thomas, S.T •. I Q.l5,a.l.Reap. "Quia igitur mundus 
non eat casu factus, sed est factus a Deo per intellectum 
agentem ••• necesae est quod in mente divina sit forma ••• " 
2 In Libr. Sent,, Dist. ;6, ~.I,a.; St. Thomas explains that 
created things exist ~ simpliciter, but in a manner of 
speaking; it is in God 1 a knowledge they exist, and are main-
tained in being. 
; Summa Theologiae I Q.I, a.;, and in Ia-IIaeQ.~l a.l, and Q.9; a.; 
Here St. Thomas remarks that God, fro~ His metaphysical attributes, 
is the only possible being that measures the universe and gives 
it and all in it a share in Truth and Goodness, and He alone can 
permit the application of these in Law. 
4 Varieties of Religious Experience, 445-46 
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On the contrary, this 'metaphysical monster 15ma.kes a great 
deal of difference in the ethical world. There is also an 
actual difference, 1n our world of everyday experience. The 
aseitas does not have the compelling quality exhibited by the 
manifestation of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity; it 
was never intended to supplant Him. James decries the met-
aphysical attributes of God as being unusable in ethics, and 
turns to the so-called moral attributes, those derived from 
Revelation, with pleasure.9 
Without an eternal law, our daily life would be unlivable. The 
universe cannot be intelligible without the Eternal La.l'l behind 
it, and n:e.n without his small reflection of that Law, could not 
exist. Nor can he be considered in his true value, without it. 
5 Ibid. 446 
6 Ibid. 447 
In saying here that the moral attributes of God are valuable 
because they invoke fear and love in man, James has for-
gotten to put the rational part of man above his rational 
appetite, in its proper place. 
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Therefore, in opposition to the dictum that permits each 
man to live under his own law, we present the necessity for there 
being a Divtne Law that is absolute, from the nature of the Being 
Whose Existence is His Law7, and this Being as Creator has given 
8 His creature, man., a natural law; and since He gave Il!1.n a share 
in His existence, in a qualified way, since Being most properly 
belongs first to God, then He mus~ also have given his creature 
some of the other a tt.ributes of His existence. For, as St. Thomas 
9 
says, whatever shares in the nature of a rule or measure is also 
ruled or measured itself. Therefore, all that are subject to God 
are measured both by Divine Law and by the law of their ot-m being, 
in a lesser way, since their very being would have no meaning 
unless it followed in some way the Being of God, the First Cause. 
7 S.T. ra-IIa8Q.91 a,l ad tertium 
8 S.T. ra-rraeQ.91 a.2 Respondeo 
9 .I!t!4,. 
r 
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Man, as the creature of God, follows the law he was given 
upon the gift. of existence. His ratio of action means the exer-
cising of activity through t.he la'fTS of his nature. 11 Unde patet 
quod lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis eternae 
in ra tioni crea tura. n 10 
It is also a result of these premisses that the natural law is 
universal and one for all men. Each man is only part of a pattern 
which depends upon the Eternal Law. 11 Sic igitur dicendum est 
quod lex naturae quantum ad prima principia, est eadem apud omnes 
et secundum rectitudinem et secundum notitiam."11 It is not through 
man's will, as adhering to the outer things of experience, but 
through his intellect, that the man operates as a truly human being. 
The pragmatic failure is in misconceiving both philoso~ and an 
important part of it: the psychology of humanity. It is true that 
moral action is only possible when man can reco,gnize a moral 
command through his intellect; there can be no primary measure in 
the things of man 1s experience as related to hie will in action. 
• • • 
10 S.T.±«-Irae Q.91 a.2.corpus 
11 ]lli. Q.94 a.4 
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